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Essay about Lobbying and Trade

<div class&equals;"td-paragraph-padding-4">&NewLine;<p><i><span style&equals;"font-weight&colon; 400&semi;">The following political science essay sample is brought by professional paper writing services from  <&sol;span><&sol;i><a href&equals;"https&colon;&sol;&sol;smartwritingservice&period;com"><i><span style&equals;"font-weight&colon; 400&semi;">https&colon;&sol;&sol;smartwritingservice&period;com<&sol;span><&sol;i><&sol;a><i><span style&equals;"font-weight&colon; 400&semi;"> and designed to help students with academic writing in college and university&period; Read the following example to create your own academic paper&period;<&sol;span><&sol;i><&sol;p>&NewLine;<p><span style&equals;"font-weight&colon; 400&semi;">Trade lobbying has been a mainstay in the US government set-up for decades&period; It is so integral to the politics of governance and foreign policy that it is sometimes referred to as the &OpenCurlyQuote;fourth branch of government’ &lpar;Ramirez&comma; 2019&rpar;&period; Such a lofty standing would come with equally lofty expectations&period; Lobbying can have both good and bad consequences depending on the intentions&period; For example&comma; the outcome might be favorable for an economic giant but harmful for a smaller entity&period; Corporate lobbying is a major player in US foreign policy formulation&comma; but it can be hazardous when policymakers consider money ahead of the public image of the nation&period;<&sol;span><&sol;p>&NewLine;<p><span style&equals;"font-weight&colon; 400&semi;">The imposition of tariffs on both imported and exported goods is perhaps the one area where lobbying has the most effect&period; Ramirez singles out the US government’s decision to impose tariffs on steel imports as an example of skewed policy&comma; based on unclear national security claims&period; He points out that the decision ignited a trade war the results of which both benefited and hurt sections of American society&period; Thailand&comma; Japan&comma; and a few other countries are enjoying special status in the form of exclusion from tariff measures by the US government &lpar;Skonieczny&comma; 2016&rpar;&period; Smaller&comma; more distant trade partners to the US have their chances even more limited by the exceptional rule&period; Japanese steel producers&comma; for example&comma; have outspent their competitors&comma; earning themselves privileged treatment&period;<&sol;span><&sol;p>&NewLine;<p><span style&equals;"font-weight&colon; 400&semi;">Corporate and interest group lobbying has some fundamental differences which make each of them distinct&period; For example&comma; interest groups such as NGOs affect political outcomes through rewards to government officials&comma; riots and protests&comma; and direct contact with congressional leaders&period; Corporations have no such advantages&period; Instead&comma; they rely on their massive financial might to donate large sums of money to political campaigns&period; However&comma; they sometimes experience mixed results&comma; including counter-lobbying and unfriendly trade climate&period;<&sol;span><&sol;p>&NewLine;<p><span style&equals;"font-weight&colon; 400&semi;">The different approaches mean each side has advantages over the other&period; Interest groups’ chief advantage is their ability to mobilize constituents&comma; both in a broad and narrow scopes&comma; to influence politics&period; That means they can lobby more cheaply compared to corporate bodies&period; However&comma; corporations have the advantage of inside lobbying&period; Industry experts provide information and sometimes write policy&period;<&sol;span><&sol;p>&NewLine;<p><span style&equals;"font-weight&colon; 400&semi;">Moreover&comma; they provide the money for think tanks&comma; media advertisements&comma; and information sheets&comma; among other things&period; NGOs have the disadvantage of misdirected or stereotypical representation of issues&period; Such differences appear to give corporations an upper hand over interest group lobbyists&period;<&sol;span><&sol;p>&NewLine;<p><span style&equals;"font-weight&colon; 400&semi;">Interest groups primarily employ outside lobbying&comma; and corporates use inside lobbying because of the deeper pockets and information power of the latter&period; Corporations arguably have the financial strength to convince Congress leaders and staff to formulate policy in a given manner&period; NGOs lack the same might&period; Thus&comma; they use mobilization as their primary tool&period; Given the circumstances&comma; inside lobbying appears to be more effective because of several reasons&period; One&comma; the corporates have the information that NGOs might be lacking&period; More importantly&comma; they offer better prospects because they have more money to fund their ideas &lpar;Sanford &amp&semi; Haffer&comma; 2005&rpar;&period; Research&comma; however&comma; does not categorically pick a winner while measuring the success of either side&period;<&sol;span><&sol;p>&NewLine;<p><span style&equals;"font-weight&colon; 400&semi;">Lobbies have hurt the US trade policy with China&period; Lobbyists crafted an anti-China narrative in regards to the Trans-Pacific Partnership&comma; adding a national security motive to it&period; Skonieczny &lpar;2016&rpar; notes that the Obama administration indicated the TPP would &OpenCurlyQuote;balance against a corrupt and menacing Chinese influence in Asia…’ The wording shows the trade war between the US and China was occasioned by anti-Chinese lobbying&period;<&sol;span><&sol;p>&NewLine;<p><span style&equals;"font-weight&colon; 400&semi;">Corporate lobbying has a major influence on US foreign policy&period; Policymakers often consider money ahead of the public image of the nation which results in disastrous consequences for the nation&period; While both interest groups and corporations have a say in the way Congress conducts its affairs&comma; the latter party has more financial might behind it&period; This disparity becomes especially obvious when one considers the U&period;S&period;-China trade war&period;<&sol;span><&sol;p>&NewLine;<h6><strong><span style&equals;"color&colon; &num;ff00ff&semi;">References<&sol;span><&sol;strong><&sol;h6>&NewLine;<p><span style&equals;"font-weight&colon; 400&semi;">Sanford&comma; G&period;&comma; &amp&semi; Hafer&comma; C&period; &lpar;2005&rpar;&period; Flexing muscle&colon; Corporate political expenditures as signals to the bureaucracy&period; <&sol;span><i><span style&equals;"font-weight&colon; 400&semi;">American Political Science Review<&sol;span><&sol;i><span style&equals;"font-weight&colon; 400&semi;">&comma; <&sol;span><i><span style&equals;"font-weight&colon; 400&semi;">99<&sol;span><&sol;i><span style&equals;"font-weight&colon; 400&semi;">&lpar;2&rpar;&comma; 245–261&period;<&sol;span><&sol;p>&NewLine;<p><span style&equals;"font-weight&colon; 400&semi;">Skonieczny&comma; A&period; &lpar;2016&comma; September 23&rpar;&period; <&sol;span><i><span style&equals;"font-weight&colon; 400&semi;">The Bern Trumps trade&colon; &lpar;The return of&rpar; American populism and anti-trade narratives<&sol;span><&sol;i><span style&equals;"font-weight&colon; 400&semi;">&period; Conference Paper presented at the International Studies Association West&comma; Pasadena&comma; CA&period;<&sol;span><&sol;p>&NewLine;<p><span style&equals;"font-weight&colon; 400&semi;">Ramirez&comma; L&period; &lpar;2019&comma; March 4&rpar;&period; Lobbying pays&comma; but for whom&quest; The case of the US-China trade war&period; <&sol;span><i><span style&equals;"font-weight&colon; 400&semi;">Kennedy School Review<&sol;span><&sol;i><span style&equals;"font-weight&colon; 400&semi;">&period; Retrieved October 21&comma; 2019&comma; from https&colon;&sol;&sol;ksr&period;hkspublications&period;org&sol;2019&sol;02&sol;28&sol;lobbying-pays-but-for-whom-the-case-of-the-us-china-trade-war&sol;&period;<&sol;span><&sol;p>&NewLine;<&sol;div>&NewLine;

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